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Abstract. We address the problem on how newly invented concepts are
evaluated with respect to a background ontology of conceptual knowl-
edge so as to decide which of them are to be accepted into a system of
familiar concepts, and how this, in turn, may affect the previously ac-
cepted conceptualisation. As technique to tackle this problem we explore
the applicability of Paul Thagard’s computational theory of coherence.
In particular, we propose a formalisation of Thagard’s notion of concep-
tual coherence for concepts represented in the AL description logic and
explore by means of an illustrative example the role coherence may play
in the process of conceptual blending.
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1 Introduction
Combinational creativity —when novel ideas (concepts, theories, solutions, works
of art) are produced through unfamiliar combinations of familiar ideas— is, of
the three forms of creativity put forward by Boden, the most difficult to cap-
ture computationally [2]. Putting concepts together to generate new concepts is,
in principle, not a difficult task; but doing this in a computationally tractable
way, and being able to recognise the value of newly invented concepts for better
understanding a certain domain, is not as straightforward.
An important recent development that has significantly influenced the cur-
rent understanding of the general cognitive principles operating during concept
invention is Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual blending [6, 7]. Fau-
connier and Turner proposed conceptual blending as the fundamental cognitive
operation underlying much of everyday thought and language, and modelled it
as a process by which humans subconsciously combine particular elements and
their relations of originally separate conceptual spaces into a unified space, in
which new elements and relations emerge, and new inferences can be drawn.
The theory has been primarily applied as an analytic tool for describing
already existing blends of ideas and concepts in a varied number of fields, such as
linguistics, music theory, poetics, mathematics, theory of art, political science,
discourse analysis, philosophy, anthropology, and the study of gesture and of
material culture [20]. But it has been also widely recognised to be a theory that
can serve as a basis for computational models of creativity [5, 9, 10, 15, 21].
To guide the concept invention process, in addition to the blending mecha-
nism per se, at least two additional dimensions need to be considered, namely
the origin and destination of concept invention, i.e., from where (and how) input
concepts are selected and to whom the concept invention is headed. Confalonieri
et al. have proposed a process model for concept invention in which these dimen-
sions are taken into account [3]. Inputs are selected based on a similarity measure
that is computed relative to a Rich Background, and blends are evaluated us-
ing an argumentation framework based on value preferences of the audience for
which concepts are invented.
In this paper, we aim at showing how Thagard’s computational theory of co-
herence [19] could also serve as an additional mechanism for triggering concept
invention and evaluating newly blended concepts. In [18], Thagard suggested to
use coherence as a model for the closely related cognitive process of conceptual
combination, where the focus is primarily on language compositionality such
as noun-noun or adjective-noun combinations [17]. Kunda and Thagard, for in-
stance, show how conceptual coherence can be used for describing how we reason
with social stereotypes [12].
Building upon Thagard’s intuitions and principles for modelling coherence,
we propose a formalisation of Thagard’s notion of conceptual coherence for con-
cepts represented in a description logic —we take the basic description logic AL
as a start— and further explore its applicability to conceptual blending. But in-
stead of interpreting coherence or incoherence based on statistical correlations or
causal relations (i.e., on frequencies of positive or negative association), we deter-
mine coherence and incoherence as dependent on how concept descriptions are
stated. Failure to find conceptual blends that cohere with some given background
knowledge leads to a search for alternative conceptual blends that eventually in-
crease the overall coherence of the blend with the background knowledge.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we give a brief overview of
Thagard’s computational theory of coherence, in Section 3 we introduce some
core definitions regarding coherence and coherence graphs, and in Section 4 we
provide a formalisation of conceptual coherence for the description logic AL.
Conceptual blending in AL is described in Section 5, and coherence is applied
to blending in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Thagard’s Computational Theory of Coherence
Thagard addresses the problem of determining which pieces of information, such
as hypotheses, beliefs, propositions or concepts, to accept and which to reject
based on how they cohere and incohere among them, given that, when two
elements cohere, they tend to be accepted together or rejected together; and
when two elements incohere, one tends to be accepted while the other tends to
be rejected [19].
This can be reformulated as a constraint satisfaction problem as follows.
Pairs of elements that cohere between them form positive constraints, and pairs
of elements that incohere between them form negative constraints. If we partition
the set of pieces of information we are dealing with into a set of accepted elements
and a set of rejected elements, then a positive constraint is satisfied if both
elements of the constraint are either among the accepted elements or among
the rejected ones; and a negative constraint is satisfied if one element of the
constraint is among the accepted ones and the other is among the rejected ones.
The coherence problem is to find the partition that maximises the number of
satisfied constraints.
Note that in general we may not be able to partition a set of elements as to
satisfy all constraints, thus ending up accepting elements that incohere between
them or rejecting an element that coheres with an accepted one. The objective
is to minimise these undesired cases. The coherence problem is known to be
NP-complete, though there exist algorithms that find good enough solutions of
the coherence problem while remaining fairly efficient.
Depending on the kind of pieces of information we start from, and on the way
the coherence and incoherence between these pieces of information is determined,
we will be dealing with different kinds of coherence problems. So, in explanatory
coherence we seek to determine the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses based
on how they cohere and incohere with given evidence or with competing hypothe-
ses; in deductive coherence we seek to determine the acceptance of rejection of
beliefs based on how they cohere and incohere due to deductive entailment or
contradiction; in analogical coherence we seek to determine the acceptance or
rejection of mapping hypotheses based on how they cohere or incohere in terms
of structure; and in conceptual coherence we seek to determine the acceptance or
rejection of concepts based on how they cohere or incohere as the result of the
positive or negative associations that can be established between them. Thagard
discusses these and other kinds of coherence.
Although Thagard provides a clear technical description of the coherence
problem as a constraint satisfaction problem, and he enumerates concrete prin-
ciples that characterise different kinds of coherences, he does not clarify the ac-
tual nature of the coherence and incoherence relations that arise between pieces
of information, nor does he suggest a precise formalisation of the principles he
discusses. Joseph et al. have proposed a concrete formalisation and realisation
of deductive coherence [11], which they applied to tackle the problem of norm
adoption in normative multi-agent system. In this paper, we shall focus on the
problem of conceptual coherence and its applicability to conceptual blending.
3 Preliminaries: Coherence Graphs
In this section we give precise definitions of the concepts intuitively introduced
in the previous section.
Definition 1. A coherence graph is an edge-weighted, undirected graph G =
〈V,E,w〉, where:
1. V is a finite set of nodes representing pieces of information.
2. E ⊆ V (2) (where V (2) = {{u, v} | u, v ∈ V }) is a finite set of edges
representing the coherence or incoherence between pieces of information.
3. w : E → [−1, 1]\{0} is an edge-weighted function that assigns a value to the
coherence between pieces of information.
Edges of coherence graphs are also called constraints.
When we partition the set V of vertices of a coherence graph (i.e., the set of
pieces of information) into a set A of accepted elements and a set R = V \ A
of rejected elements, then we can say when a constraint —an edge between
vertices— is satisfied or not by the partition.
Definition 2. Given a coherence graph G = 〈V,E,w〉, and a partition (A,R)
of V , the set of satisfied constraints C(A,R) ⊆ E is given by:
C(A,R) =
{
{u, v} ∈ E
∣∣∣ u ∈ A iff v ∈ A, whenever w({u, v}) > 0
u ∈ A iff v ∈ R, whenever w({u, v}) < 0
}
All other constraints (i.e., those in E \ C(A,R)) are said to be unsatisfied.
The coherence problem is to find the partition of vertices that satisfies as
much constraints as possible, i.e., to find the partition that maximises the co-
herence value as defined as follows, which makes coherence to be independent of
the size of the coherence graph.
Definition 3. Given a coherence graph G = 〈V,E,w〉, the coherence of a par-
tition (A,R) of V is given by
κ(G, (A,R)) =
∑
{u,v}∈C(A,R)
|w({u, v})|
|E|
Notice that there may not exist a unique partition with a maximum coherence
value. Actually, at least two partitions have the same coherence value, since
κ(G, (A,R)) = κ(G, (R,A)) for any partition (A,R) of V .
4 Conceptual Coherence in Description Logics
Thagard characterises conceptual coherence with these principles [19]:
Symmetry: Conceptual coherence is a symmetric relation between pairs of con-
cepts.
Association: A concept coheres with another concept if they are positively
associated, i.e., if there are objects to which they both apply.
Given Concepts: The applicability of a concept to an object may be given
perceptually or by some other reliable source.
Negative Association: A concept incoheres with another concept if they are
negatively associated, i.e., if an object falling under one concept tends not
to fall under the other concept.
Acceptance: The applicability of a concept to an object depends on the appli-
cability of other concepts.
To provide a precise account of these principles we shall formalise Association
and Negative Association between concepts expressed in a description logic, since
these are the principles defining coherence and incoherence. We shall assume
coherence between two concept descriptions when we have explicitly stated that
one subsumes the other (“there are objects to which both apply”); and we shall
assume incoherence when we have explicitly stated that they are disjoint (“an
object falling under one concept tends not to fall under the other concept”).
Definition 4. Given a Tbox T in description logic AL and a pair of concept
descriptions C,D 6∈ {>,⊥}, we will say that:
– C coheres with D, if C v D ∈ T , and that
– C incoheres with D, if C v ¬D ∈ T or C uD v ⊥ ∈ T .
In addition, coherence and incoherence between concept descriptions depend on
the concept constructors used, and we will say that, for all atomic concepts A,
atomic roles R, and concept descriptions C,D 6∈ {>,⊥}:
– ¬A incoheres with A;
– C uD coheres both with C and with D;
– ∀R.C coheres (or incoheres) with ∀R.D, if C coheres (or incoheres) with D.1
Symmetry follows from the definition above, and Acceptance is captured by
the aim of maximising coherence in a coherence graph. For this we need to define
how a TBox determines a coherence graph, and, in order to keep the graph
finite, we express coherence and incoherence only between non-trivial concept
descriptions (i.e., excluding > and ⊥) that are explicitly stated in the TBox.
Definition 5. Let T be a TBox in AL. The set of non-trivial subconcepts of
T is given as
sub(T ) =
⋃
CvD∈T
sub(C) ∪ sub(D)
where sub is defined over the structure of concept descriptions as follows:
sub(A) = {A}
sub(⊥) = ∅
sub(>) = ∅
sub(¬A) = {¬A,A}
sub(C uD) = {C uD} ∪ sub(C) ∪ sub(D)
sub(∀R.C) = {∀R.C} ∪ sub(C)
sub(∃R.>) = {∃R.>}
1 Note that since AL allows only for limited existential quantification we cannot pro-
vide a general rule for coherence between concept descriptions of the form ∃R.>.
Definition 6. The coherence graph of a TBox T is the edge-weighted, undi-
rected graph G = 〈V,E,w〉 whose vertices are non-trivial subconcepts of T (i.e.,
V = sub(T )), whose edges link subconcepts that either cohere or incohere accord-
ing to Definition 4, and whose edge-weight function w is given as follows:
w({C,D}) =
{
1 if C and D cohere
−1 if C and D incohere
5 Conceptual Blending in AL
We follow the modelling principles and techniques of [4], where the process of
conceptual blending is characterised by the notion of amalgams [1, 14]. According
to this approach, the process of conceptual blending can be described as follows:
1. We take a taxonomy of concepts described in a background ontology ex-
pressed as a Tbox T .
2. A mental space of an atomic concept A is modelled, for the purpose of con-
ceptual blending, by means of a subsumption A v C specifying the necessary
conditions we are focusing on.
3. The new concept to be invented is represented by the concept description
that conjoins the atomic concepts to be blended.
4. With amalgams we generalise the input spaces based on the taxonomy in
our TBox until a satisfactory blend is generated.
Formally, the notion of amalgams can be defined in any representation lan-
guage L for which a subsumption relation between formulas (or descriptions) of
L can be defined, and therefore also in the set of all AL concept descriptions
with the subsumption relation vT .
To formally specify an amalgam we first need to introduce some notions. Let
NC be a set of concept names, NR be a set of role names, and L(T ) be the finite
set of all AL concept descriptions that can be formed with the concept and role
names occurring in an AL TBox T . Then:
Definition 7. Given two descriptions C1, C2 ∈ L(T ):
– A most general specialisation (MGS) is a description Cmgs such that Cmgs vT
C1 and Cmgs vT C2 and for any other description D such that D vT C1
and D vT C2, then D vT Cmgs.
– A least general generalisation (LGG) is a description Clgg such that C1 vT
Clgg and C2 vT Clgg and for any other description D such that C1 vT D
and C2 vT D, then Clgg vT D.
Intuitively, an MGS is a description that has some of the information from both
original descriptions C1 and C2, while an LGG contains what is common to
them.
An amalgam or blend of two descriptions is a new description that contains
parts from these original descriptions and it can be formally defined as follows.
House Boat
House
House u Boat
Boat
GenericSpace
Fig. 1. A diagram of an amalgam HouseBoat from descriptions House and Boat and
their respective generalisations House and Boat. Arrows indicate the subsumption of
the target by the source of the arrow.
Definition 8 (Amalgam). Let T be an AL TBox. A description Cam ∈ L(T )
is an amalgam of two descriptions C1 and C2 (with LGG Clgg) if there exist two
descriptions C1 and C2 such that: C1 vT C1 vT Clgg, C2 vT C2 vT Clgg, and
Cam is an MGS of C1 and C2.
The number of blends that satisfies the above definition can be very large and
selection criteria for filtering and ordering them are therefore needed. Faucon-
nier and Turner discussed optimality principles [7], however, these principles are
difficult to capture in a computational way, and other selection strategies need
to be explored. Since we use a logical theory such as AL, one way to evaluate
a blend is consistency checking. Another alternative, that we will investigate in
this paper, is to evaluate blends in terms of conceptual coherence.
The LGG and the generalised descriptions, needed to compute the amalgam
as defined above, are obtained by means of a generalisation refinement operator
that allows us to find generalisations of AL concept descriptions.
5.1 Generalising AL descriptions
Roughly speaking, a generalisation operator takes a concept C as input and
returns a set of descriptions that are more general than C by taking a Tbox T
into account.
In order to define a generalisation refinement operator for AL, we define
the upward cover set of atomic concepts. In the following definition, sub(T )
(Definition 5) guarantees the following upward cover set to be finite.
Definition 9. Let T be an AL TBox with concept names from NC . The upward
cover set of an atomic concept A ∈ NC ∪ {>,⊥} with respect to T is given as:
UpCov(A) := {C ∈ sub(T ) ∪ {>,⊥} | A vT C (1)
and there is no C ′ ∈ sub(T ) ∪ {>,⊥}
such that A @T C ′ @T C}
We can now define our generalisation refinement operator for AL as follows.
Definition 10. Let T be an AL TBox. We define the generalisation refinement
operator γ inductively over the structure of concept descriptions as follows:
γ(A) = UpCov(A)
γ(>) = UpCov(>) = ∅
γ(⊥) = UpCov(⊥)
γ(C uD) = {C ′ uD | C ′ ∈ γ(C)} ∪ {C uD′ | D′ ∈ γ(D)} ∪ {C,D}
γ(∀r.C) =
{{∀r.C ′ | C ′ ∈ γ(C)} whenever γ(C) 6= ∅
{>} otherwise.
γ(∃r.>) = ∅
We should notice at this point that γ can return concept descriptions that are
equivalent to the concept being generalised. One possible way to avoid this sit-
uation is to discard these generalisations [4]. Given a generalisation refinement
operator γ, AL concepts are related by refinement paths as described next.
Definition 11. A finite sequence C1, . . . , Cn of AL concepts is a concept refine-
ment path C1
γ−→ Cn from C1 to Cn of the generalisation refinement operator γ
iff Ci+1 ∈ γ(Ci) for all i : 1 ≤ i < n. γ∗(C) denotes the set of all concepts that
can be reached from C by means of γ in a finite number of steps.
The repetitive application of the generalisation refinement operator allows us to
find a description that represents the properties that two or more AL concepts
have in common. This description is a common generalisation of AL concepts,
the so-called generic space that is used in conceptual blending.
Definition 12. An AL concept description G is a generic space of the AL
concept descriptions C1, . . . , Cn if and only if G ∈ γ′∗(Ci) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
5.2 An Example: The House-Boat Blend
The process of conceptual blending in terms of amalgams can be illustrated by
means of a typical blend example: the house-boat [7, 8]. The precise formalisation
is not critique at this point, different ones exist [9, 15], but all provide similar
distinctions.
The AL theories for House and Boat introduce the axioms modelling the
mental spaces for house and boat.
House v ∀usedBy.Resident u ∀on.Land
Boat v ∀usedBy.Passenger u ∀on.Water
The House and Boat theories cannot be directly blended since they generate
an inconsistency. This is due to the background ontology stating that the medium
on which an object is situated cannot be land and water at the same time
(Figure 2). Therefore, some parts of the House and Boat descriptions need to be
generalised in a controlled manner before these concepts can be blended. The
House v Object Resident v Person
Boat v Object Passenger v Person
Land v Medium Person uMedium v ⊥
Water v Medium Object uMedium v ⊥
Water u Land v ⊥ Object u Person v ⊥
Fig. 2. The background ontology of the House and Boat.
generic space between a house and a boat—an object that is on a medium and
used-by a person—is a lower bound in the space of generalisations that need
to be explored in order to generalise these concepts and to blend them into a
house-boat. The generic space is obtained according to Definition 12 by applying
the refinement operator γ.
Example 1. Let us consider the House and Boat concepts. Their generic space
is: ∀usedBy.Personu ∀on.Medium and is obtained as follows. In the House concept,
the subconcepts ∀usedBy.Resident and ∀on.Land are generalised to ∀usedBy.Person
and ∀on.Medium respectively. In the Boat concept, the subconcepts ∀usedBy.
Passenger and ∀on.Water are generalised in a similar way.
From a conceptual blending point of view, the house-boat blend can be created
when the medium on which a house is situated (land) becomes the medium
on which boat is situated (water), and the resident of the house becomes the
passenger of the boat. This blend can be obtained when the input concepts house
and boat are generalised as follows:
House v ∀usedBy.Resident u ∀on.Medium
Boat v ∀usedBy.Person u ∀on.Water
The house-boat blend is obtained by conjoining the generalised mental spaces
House and Boat (Figure 1). It is easy to see that House u Boat is an amalgam
according to Definition 8.
6 Evaluating the Coherence of Conceptual Blends
This section describes how coherence is used to evaluate blends. That is, how
coherence graphs are built, and how the different coherence values are to be
interpreted. The overall idea is to compute the coherence graph and maximsing
partitions for each blend, and use the maximal coherence degree of the coherence
graphs to rank the blends.
Let T be the TBox of the background ontology, let A v C and B v D be
the axioms representing our mental spaces, and let AuB be the new concept we
would like to invent. The process of evaluating blends according to conceptual
coherence can be described as follows:
1. Given the mental spaces, we generate a candidate blend according to Defi-
nition 8.
2. We form the coherence graph for T ∪{A v C,B v D}, including node AuB,
according to Definition 6.
3. We compute the coherence maximising partitions according to Definition 3
and we associate it to the blend.
4. We repeat this procedure for all the blends that can be generated from the
mental spaces.
Once the maximising partitions are computed, the coherence of the blend could
be measured in terms of the coherence value of the coherence-maximising par-
titions. The degree of the coherence graph directly measures how much a blend
coheres with the background ontology.
Definition 13. Let G = 〈V,E,w〉 the coherence graph of a blend B and let P
the set of partitions of G. The maximal coherence value of B of G is deg(B) =
max
P∈P
{κ(G,P )}.
This maximal coherence value can be used to rank blends as follows.
Definition 14. Let T be a TBox of a background ontology, let A v C and
B v D be the axioms representing mental spaces, let B be the set of blends that
can be generated from them. For each b1, b2 ∈ B, we say that b1 is preferred to
b2 (b1  b2) if and only if deg(b1) ≥ deg(b2).
To exemplify how the coherence degree can be used to evaluate blends, we
consider the house-boat example. According to the amalgams process of concep-
tual blending described in the previous section, several blends can be generated
by blending the mental space of House and Boat. In particular, the concept
House u Boat is a valid blend.
The coherence graph blending the House and Boat directly is shown in
Figure 3. As expected the concepts House and Boat positively coheres with
the axioms representing the mental spaces and with the concept House u Boat,
which is representing the blend. The incoherence relation between ∀on.Land and
∀on.Water is due to the fact that the concepts Water and Land incohere, since
the background ontology contains the disjointness axiom Water u Land v ⊥. The
coherence graph of House and Boat has a maximal coherence value of 0.84.
For the sake of our example, we generate new blends by generalising the ax-
ioms modelling our mental spaces. For instance, by applying the generalisations
seen in the previous section that lead to the creation of the house-boat blend, we
obtain the coherence graph in Figure 4.2 The coherence graph of blending House
and Boat has a maximal coherence value of 0.9. This graph yields a higher coher-
ence degree since generalising ∀on.Land to ∀on.Medium prevents the appearance
of the incoherence relation between ∀on.Land and ∀on.Water.
It is easy to see that the blend House u Boat is preferred to House u Boat
since it has a maximal coherence degree that is higher.
2 Concepts belonging to the background ontology are omitted.
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Fig. 3. The coherence graph of the House u Boat blend, showing the main concepts and
their coherence relations. Blue and green coloured boxes represent concepts belonging
to the background ontology and to the input mental spaces respectively.
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Fig. 4. The coherence graph of the House u Boat blend, showing the main concepts
and coherence relations. Generalised concepts are displayed in a darker tonality.
7 Conclusion
This paper should be seen as a first attempt to (a) provide a formal account of
conceptual coherence for a particular concept representation language, and (b)
to explore its applicability for guiding the process of conceptual blending.
With respect to (a), we proposed a formalisation of conceptual coherence
between concept descriptions expressed in the basic AL description logic. This is
only a starting point, and obviously this formalisation exercise should be carried
out for more expressive concept representation languages. Usually, coherence and
incoherence are not treated only in binary terms, but it is of them natural to
take certain degrees of coherence or incoherence into account. This, for instance,
has also been the approach of Joseph et al. when formalising deductive coherence
[11]. Although there is not an obvious way to do so with the formalisation of
conceptual coherence of AL proposed in this paper, we do not discard that this
could be done for more expressive concept representation languages. One could
imagine that description logics with number restrictions or nominals, such as
SROIQ for instance, would allow for expressing degrees of concept overlap that
could be interpreted as degrees of coherence or incoherence.
With respect to (b), we have so far only focused on how the coherence val-
ues of a graph of concept descriptions were evolving dependent on how these
descriptions were changing in our amalgam-based conceptual blending process.
However, we have not discussed yet an other important aspect of coherence the-
ory, namely how to interpret the two parts of a coherence-maximising partition:
the set of accepted and of rejected concepts. The information that a particular
concept description falls in the set of accepted concepts or in the set of rejected
concepts could also be taken into account to decide the acceptance or rejection of
newly invented concepts; or even of already existing concepts in the background
knowledge, in the light of newly invented concepts. With the formalisation in
AL given in this paper we could not see yet a clear way to provide such an in-
terpretation of acceptance and rejection, but we think this aspect might become
clearer as a wider range of concept representation languages is explored.
In this paper we attempted to see how coherence could be used as another
tool for guiding the process of conceptual blending and for evaluating conceptual
blends in the task of concept invention; an additional technique to those already
proposed, such as optimality principles [16], logical consistency [13], and values
of audiences [3]. We believe it is worth to further study the proper combination
of these techniques and to carry out a comprehensive evaluation.
An implementation of conceptual coherence presented in this paper using the
OWL API and Answer Set Programming is available at: https://rconfalonieri@
bitbucket.org/rconfalonieri/coinvent-coherence.git.
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